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Why Do Complementors Participate? An Analysis of 
Partnership Networks in the Enterprise Software Industry 
ABSTRACT 
In the enterprise software industry, large providers (hubs) are fostering partner networks with 
smaller companies (spokes) that complement their platforms. This study takes the perspective 
of these spokes and seeks to understand their motivation to partner. It is the first to 
simultaneously examine two theoretical perspectives that help explain partnership formation. 
The input-oriented perspective holds that organizations enter inter-firm arrangements in 
order to access external resources and capabilities. The output-oriented perspective posits 
that the complementarity of the partners’ products influences the benefits obtained from a 
partnership. In order to examine the relevancy and possible interaction of these two 
perspectives, a multiple-case study is conducted. Qualitative data from 17 spoke organizations 
is gathered and thoroughly analyzed. The study confirms that the hub's reputation and its 
capability to provide integrated systems are generally important reasons for partnering. 
However, the extent to which the hub’s innovativeness and its commercial capital motivate 
spokes to partner varies substantially. The key finding of this study is that these variations can 
be explained by differences in the level of product complementarity. This leads to the 
conclusion that there is a widely neglected interaction effect between the input- and output-
oriented perspectives in explaining the formation of hub-and-spoke partnerships. 
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MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE STATEMENT 
This study's results are informative for organizations that form partnerships in the 
enterprise software industry, both large platform vendors and complementors. 
Complementors learn that the resources and capabilities of a larger partner are not generally 
advantageous. In contrast, the benefits resulting from external resources and capabilities are 
contingent on the level of complementarity between the partners’ solutions. In particular, if a 
complementor and a platform vendor operate at the same layer in the software stack, the 
smaller partner has to be aware of the risks arising from the platform vendor’s 
innovativeness. This study’s findings also provide helpful guidance for large enterprise 
software vendors that establish partnership networks. In order to attract and select partners 
and manage the partnerships in a better way, platform vendors need to know which 
capabilities are targeted by complementors and be aware of interactions between resource 
and product characteristics. The study’s results can be applied to other industries and inform 
organizations in hub-and-spoke networks outside the enterprise software domain.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Enterprise application software (EAS) providers develop and offer solutions that range 
from components and modules that support particular business functions to cross-functional or 
inter-organizational enterprise systems which are integrated through comprehensive 
middleware [1]. In the early days of computing, these systems were mostly custom-developed 
in a make-to-order fashion. In the 1970s, standardized monolithic solutions emerged that 
covered the majority of business requirements of a variety of customers and hence became 
state of the art during the 1980s and 1990s [2]. The emergence of these systems turned the 
formerly diverse industry into an oligopolistic structure with a few dominating system vendors 
producing best practice solutions for different industries [1, 2].  
In recent years, however, established vendors have tried to reduce system costs and 
complexity by designing the formerly integrated EAS in a more modular way [3-7]. This 
tendency toward disintegration has been facilitated by the emergence of new standards and 
middleware concepts, such as service-oriented architectures (SOA), which support a modular 
system design [8]. From a theoretical point of view, the tendency toward disintegrated systems 
should be reflected by a higher degree of organizational modularity and flexibility [9, 10]. 
However, in spite of a higher inter-organizational division of labor in the EAS industry, a 
seamless coordination between different organizations and a friction-free mixing and 
matching of software components from different vendors is still an elusive ideal. Instead, 
partnership networks have emerged in which companies of the EAS industry cooperate based 
on mutual agreements [11]. Within these partnership networks, a limited number of large 
organizations, often referred to as hubs, platform leaders, or keystones [12, 13], provide the 
systems’ architecture as well as generic core functionalities, while smaller independent 
software vendors (ISVs), often referred to as complementors, spokes, or niche players, build 
their solutions on top of and complement these platforms [13-16]. These partnership networks 
may be described as loosely-coupled systems [17], where the participants are neither linked by 
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capital (e.g., joint ventures) nor through joint efforts in specific projects or business areas 
(e.g., strategic alliances), but rather by more general agreements usually based on 
certifications of the other party’s products or resources [18-20].  
Previous contributions on hub-and-spoke partnership networks have mostly focused on the 
platform vendor, that is the hubs [13, 21]. It has been argued that hubs benefit from partnering 
with a large number of spokes due to the existence of two-sided network effects [22]. The 
software platform of a hub becomes more valuable if a greater number of compatible products 
exist, possibly turning the solution of the winner in this system competition into a de facto 
standard [23]. Thus, the attractiveness of taking on the role of a strategic center increases with 
the growth of the network [24, 25]. Previous literature has argued that the selection of 
appropriate partner firms is crucial for the success of hub organizations [24], implicitly 
assuming that potential partners are willing to enter collaborations. Yet, a clear understanding 
of what motivates complementors to participate in a certified partnership with a platform 
vendor is still missing. In fact, previous research has argued that there is “evidence that inter-
organizational collaborations are more likely if partners have similar status and power” [26, p. 
804], a scenario that can rarely be found in the EAS industry. Therefore, this study raises the 
following research question: 
Why do complementor organizations within the enterprise software industry participate in 
hub-and-spoke networks? 
In answering this research question, this study is the first that integrates two theoretical 
perspectives that previous research has applied separately. The first one is widely accepted in 
the literature on inter-firm partnership arrangements. According to this perspective, 
organizations form partnerships in order to gain access to external resources and capabilities. 
The second perspective is less established. It draws on recent work regarding product-level 
complementarities between the solutions provided by (potential) partners and holds that the 
benefits from partnering are influenced by output-oriented complementarities. Both streams 
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have not been investigated conclusively in the specific context of hub-and-spoke structures in 
the enterprise software industry. In particular, no effort has been made to integrate both 
streams. Therefore, it is intriguing to examine how both the input- and output-oriented 
perspectives interact in explaining why complementors participate in hub-and-spoke networks.  
From a methodological point of view, this study represents a positivist exploratory 
multiple-case study [27]. It is positivist in that a set of key resources and capabilities as well as 
product structures are identified a priori as a theoretical basis to guide the gathering and 
analysis of empirical data. It is exploratory in that the interaction of the input- and the output-
oriented perspectives in explaining partnership formation is yet to be elaborated. In line with 
the theory emergent character of the study, a qualitative approach was favored. Data was 
gathered through expert interviews and secondary sources from a limited number of spoke 
companies (i.e., complementors) that participate in one of the partnership networks established 
by two different hub organizations. The objective was to thoroughly understand the spokes’ 
partnership motivation in retrospective and to match these motivations with the input- and 
output-oriented perspectives, as previously theorized.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections provide an overview of extant 
literature as well as the theoretical foundation of the study. Subsequently, the research design 
is developed and the empirical findings are presented. Finally, the theoretical contribution and 
managerial implications as well as the study’s limitations and opportunities for future research 
are discussed. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous work on the antecedents of partnership formation in the software industry has argued 
that firms enter inter-organizational arrangements to obtain access to external resources [28, 
29]. This resource-based view is based on the assumption that firms represent bundles of 
resources and capabilities that are heterogeneously distributed across organizational actors 
[30-35]. Accordingly, based on this input-oriented perspective, organizations form 
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partnerships in order to gain access to resources and capabilities that they lack, but which the 
partner possesses [29, 36, 37]. In particular, organizations are assumed to partner in order to 
obtain access to another firm’s dynamic capabilities, as these capabilities are often difficult 
and costly to create [35]. Dynamic capabilities refer to “a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, 
usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end” [38, p. 35]. 
Getting access to such dynamic capabilities of partner firms is particularly valuable in 
dynamic business contexts, like the EAS industry [39]. However, what are the relevant 
dynamic capabilities in the EAS industry? A few studies have shed some light on this 
question. For example, Huang et al. [18] studied the determinants of ISVs’ decision to join the 
software ecosystems (i.e., networks) of platform owners. The study showed that spokes 
partner with a platform vendor if the spokes possess high downstream marketing capabilities 
and if they are able to protect their innovations through property rights. However, little insight 
was provided on the capabilities of the hub that attract the spokes to partner. 
In another study, Mathiassen and Vainio [40] proposed a sense-and-response framework to 
understand and actively manage the dynamic capabilities of small software firms. Among 
other results, the authors concluded that small software firms should cultivate external 
relationships. Along with highlighting the need to closely interact with customers, it was 
argued that small software firms often depend on “one or a few large powerful players” [40]. 
However, this leaves open the question on why these powerful players should be a source of 
valuable resources and capabilities for the smaller firms. 
Chellappa and Saraf [41] studied the structure and success of inter-firm networks in the 
enterprise software industry by applying social network analysis. The authors built their 
analysis on resource-based reasoning, assuming that software firms “gain access to social and 
technical resources through their ties” with partner firms [41, p. 3]. This was found to be 
particularly true for small software firms. Yet, the authors did not explicitly account for the 
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specific structure of hub-and-spoke networks. Moreover, the paper did not investigate in detail 
what these “social and technical resources” are. 
Besides this input-oriented perspective on partnership formation in the EAS industry, there 
is an emergent stream that examines partnerships in the EAS industry from an output-oriented 
perspective. This perspective is based on the theory of complementarities which studies the 
superadditive value of combining activities [42]. It has been suggested that the success of 
inter-firm arrangements within the software industry is influenced by the degree of product 
complementarity that exists between the partnering firms [43, 44]. In this context, 
complementarity has been defined as the relative distance within a layered software 
architecture [45]. It was found that partnerships between software firms are particularly 
successful if complementarity is low, that is, if the partners reside on the same or adjacent 
layers in the software stack [44].  
Given that product-level complementarity influences partnership success, it is likely to also 
play an important role when it comes to a spoke’s decision to partner with a platform vendor. 
However, the results from previous research show inconsistencies regarding the question of 
how product-level complementarities influence the decision to participate in partnerships. 
While the results of Gao and Iyer [44] suggest that small software firms would enter 
partnerships with firms that show a low level of product complementarity, Huang et al. [18] 
found that low product complementarity (i.e., competing products) discourages partnering. In 
turn, Chellappa and Saraf [41] found that software firms may benefit from partnerships both 
with competitors as well as with firms that provide complementary solutions. 
To sum up, results regarding the relevancy of the input-oriented (i.e., resource-based) 
perspective in explaining partnership formation are generally consistent. However, there is 
little knowledge about the actual types of hub resources and capabilities that motivate the 
spoke to partner within the context of the EAS industry. Findings from the output-oriented 
perspective, that is, the role of product complementarities, in explaining partnership formation 
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and success are rather inconsistent. In particular, there is little knowledge about the combined 
effect of the two perspectives, that is, whether there is a possible interaction between them. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this study is 1) to extend the resource-oriented 
perspective by elaborating a key set of hub resources and capabilities that attract spokes to 
partner with a hub, and 2) to examine how a combination of the input- and output-oriented 
(i.e., product-based) perspectives can help explain partnership formation in the EAS industry 
[46]. 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Using the previous literature review as our background, we develop a theoretical 
framework on partnership formation in hub-and-spoke networks. The framework takes the 
perspective of spoke organizations and covers both the input- and the output-oriented 
theoretical perspectives identified in the literature review. Figure 1 summarizes the resulting 
framework. 
A. Input-oriented Perspective: External Resources and Capabilities 
One of the key challenges of the input-oriented perspective is to identify those resources 
and capabilities of hub organizations that motivate spokes to enter partnerships with a 
platform leader (i.e., hub). To this end, we draw on the literature on inter-firm linkages that 
categorized resources and capabilities into three broad categories: technological, commercial, 
and social capital [37]. These three concepts were found to be of high relevancy for explaining 
inter-firm linkages in many domains, particularly in high-tech industries, such as the EAS 
industry [47]. Moreover, they provide an overall umbrella to capture those external resources 
and capabilities that were found to be primary motives for participating in partnerships in the 
software industry [18, 40, 41].  
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Figure 1: Spokes’ motivation to participate in hub-and-spoke networks in the EAS industry 
Technological Capital. Spokes may partner with hub organizations in order to get access 
to technological capital. The hub’s technological capital can be separated into two sub-
dimensions: the hub’s current ability to provide integrated systems and its future-directed 
capability to innovate these systems [47]. 
Spoke organizations may benefit from the hub’s current ability to provide integrated 
systems for various reasons. Most often, the EAS products and solutions offered by small 
vendors only cover a small fraction of the information system needs of their customers. In 
fact, the spoke’s solutions are frequently of little value without being compatible with other 
components or modules as well as with the underlying architecture of the entire information 
system of the customer. Given that a significant portion of the core functionality and 
architecture is provided by hub organizations, it is important for spokes to connect to the 
11 
system offered by a hub [2]. The hub possesses the capability to provide integrated systems 
stemming from its historically grown, profound understanding of cross-functional business 
processes, as well as various underlying technological disciplines. It is the hub’s core 
competency to understand the system in its entirety, including its relevant functional 
parameters, its underlying technology, and its architecture, that is, the interfaces that exist 
between its various components [14]. Large enterprise resource planning (ERP) providers are 
typical examples of such hubs. Their huge success is essentially built on their ability to 
provide integrated systems that cover and link the core business functions that organizations 
need [1].  
Similarly, the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the automotive industry serve 
as platform leaders. Smaller partner firms are keen on building knowledge-sharing networks 
with these OEMs in order to benefit from their knowledge about production processes and 
product design [34, 48]. Hence in the EAS industry, by becoming a certified partner of a hub 
organization, small spoke companies may get access to valuable knowledge about the 
functionalities and interfaces of their larger partner’s systems, that is, to the hub’s capability to 
provide integrated systems [49]. This is deemed necessary for the spokes to ensure inter-
operability and co-value of their solutions with those of the hub. Accordingly, we propose the 
following: 
Proposition 1a: Small software producers (spokes) are motivated to partner with a large EAS 
platform leader (hub) because of its capability to provide integrated systems. 
Getting access to the hub’s capability to provide integrated systems allows spoke 
organizations to exploit the potential of their own solutions to contribute to the hub’s system. 
This rather short-term-oriented perspective has also been referred to as “synchronic” systems 
integration capability, which describes the ability to exploit current resources to design the 
product concept, decompose it into modules, coordinate the network of suppliers, and then 
recompose the product within a given architecture [14]. Beyond exploitation, however, 
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continuous exploration of new potentials is also important for spoke organizations. This long-
term ability to change systems incrementally or radically has been referred to as “diachronic” 
systems integration capability [14]. These diachronic capabilities are closely linked to the 
concept of innovativeness which constitutes one of the key dynamic capabilities of small 
software firms [40]. However, how should a spoke benefit from the hub’s ability to innovate? 
In order to answer this question it is instructive to distinguish between modular (i.e., 
component) and system innovations [50]. While modular innovations accrue within the 
boundaries of a component, system innovations affect the general structure by which the 
components are bound together to form a coherent whole. For example, the emergence of 
SOAs is an important system innovation in the EAS industry because it provides a new way to 
build modular and flexible systems based on software components.  
Establishing such system innovations requires the ability to understand interdependencies 
between different components as well as the functionality of the entire system [50]. In other 
words, these system innovations are not confined to the narrowly circumscribed components 
in which the spokes specialize. Thus, it can be assumed that small vendors face difficulties in 
innovating at the system level. In contrast, in order to stay competitive in the system 
competition with rival vendors, hub organizations have to continuously improve the overall 
system. For instance, many hubs have built their own SOA standard. Spokes are forced to 
keep up with the hub’s system innovations. That is, they need to get access to the hub’s latest 
knowledge on system innovations in order to adapt or rebuild their solutions accordingly. This 
knowledge access may be achieved by partnering with a hub. Accordingly, we propose the 
following: 
Proposition 1b: Small software producers (spokes) are motivated to partner with a large 
EAS provider (hub) because of its capability to innovate system architectures. 
Commercial Capital. Commercial capital has been defined as an organization’s 
“manufacturing and marketing capabilities, and assets such as manufacturing facilities and 
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service and distribution networks” [37, p. 320]. In the case of the EAS industry, 
manufacturing assets and capabilities are of minor importance. Once developed, the marginal 
cost for producing additional entities of the software product is close to zero, given that the 
software can simply be copied on DVDs or distributed through communication networks [23]. 
Accordingly, we focus on the hubs’ marketing capabilities as well as service and distribution 
networks as key sources of commercial capital. 
As small and innovative companies are limited in their ability to make large investments 
into marketing activities and to build up distribution networks, they may strongly benefit from 
partnerships with large hub organizations [51]. These hubs are usually global players with 
very sophisticated marketing and distribution capabilities. Getting access to the hub’s 
commercial capital may enable the spoke to substantially increase the visibility and the 
availability of its products among a large number of potential customers [36, 37, 47]. For 
example, partnering was found to be a viable strategy to enter foreign markets [52-54]. The 
scope of the hub organization’s marketing support may range from a simple communication of 
the partnership with the spoke to the actual recommendation of the spoke’s solutions. Hence, 
the following proposition is put forth: 
Proposition 1c: Small software producers (spokes) are motivated to partner with a large EAS 
provider (hub) because of its capability to address broad markets. 
Social Capital. In the context of this study, social capital refers to the reputation of a firm 
in the market that is often closely aligned with the brand name of a firm [37]. Small and 
recently founded companies often face the challenge that they are unknown in the market and 
that potential customers are doubtful about the quality and reliability of their products and 
services. Signaling trustworthiness is of special importance in the EAS industry since the 
quality of software as well as the knowledge and experience with regard to business processes 
are difficult to assess in advance [20, 55]. The reputation of large system providers may help 
small vendors overcome this problem. Through a partnership with a hub and the associated 
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official certification of the spokes’ resources or products by the hub, small companies can 
increase the level of trust in their solutions and signal sustainability [19, 20, 37]. Prominently 
positioning the brand name of a hub organization within its own marketing efforts therefore 
helps spoke organizations signal their trustworthiness to potential customers. This leads to the 
following proposition:  
Proposition 1d: Small software producers (spokes) are motivated to partner with a large EAS 
provider (hub) because of its high reputation in the market. 
B. Output-oriented Perspective: Product-level Complementarity 
While most of the extant literature has focused on external resources and capabilities as key 
determinants of inter-firm partnerships, recent contributions have studied the role of product-
level complementarity in inter-firm arrangements in the software industry. Drawing on Gao 
and Iyer [43, 44], we define product-level complementarity as the relative distance of two 
products within a layered software stack model [4, 45]. Within this software stack model, 
enterprise software is assumed to comprise both the business application layer and the 
middleware layer, which in turn build on lower layers like system software and hardware (see 
Figure 2).  
The question raised is whether the level of complementarity per se (i.e., the level of 
distance in the software stack) determines partnership formation. Previous literature on inter-
firm linkages in the software industry provided rather inconsistent results regarding the 
benefits obtained from different levels of complementarity between the products of partners 
(i.e., different levels of distance in the software stack model). These inconsistencies speak 
against a direct impact of product complementarity on partnership formation. At the same 
time, however, the particular hub resources and capabilities proposed earlier may not play the 
same role for partnership motivation in each hub-and-spoke relationship. It is therefore 
intriguing to examine whether interaction effects exist between product complementarity and 
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the impact of particular resources and capabilities of the hub. Rather than affecting the 
motivation to partner directly, the degree of product level complementarity may change the 
extent to which certain resources and capabilities are driving partnership motivation. Thus, in 
line with the exploratory nature of studying such combined effects, the following proposition 
is put forth: 
Proposition 2: The level of product complementarity interacts with the extent to which 
particular resources and capabilities of the hub motivate the spoke to participate in a hub-
and-spoke network.  
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Figure 2: Layered stack model of EAS (based on [45]) 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Methodology  
For scrutinizing and refining the theoretical framework, a multiple-case study approach 
was chosen [27, 56-58]. This approach is particularly appropriate for answering research 
questions of how and why, such as why spoke organizations participate in hub-and-spoke 
networks in the EAS industry [57, 59].  
Qualitative research is well-suited for exploring new theoretical relationships, like the 
proposed interaction effect between the input- and output- oriented factors (see P2) [60]. The 
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qualitative case study allowed us to consider the context of particular hub-and-spoke 
relationships in detail, for example, by examining the technological interfaces that existed 
between the products of hub and spoke as well as the inter-personal relationships between the 
partnering firms’ employees [56]. This contextual background was particularly important to 
understand why spokes seek to get access to particular hub resources and capabilities. 
Moreover, it enabled us to grasp in retrospective how the perceptions of the spokes about 
particular hub resources and capabilities have changed over time, possibly in combination 
with changes in the product portfolios of hub and spoke. Thereby, we were able to better 
understand the combined impact of external resources and product-level complementarities on 
partnership motivation. 
Besides illustrating the proposed theoretical relationship through contextually enriched case 
data, the qualitative data was coded along the theoretical dimensions. The goal of this coding 
was to provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of particular hub resources and 
capabilities as well as to examine the proposed combined impact of the input-oriented factors 
and the level of product complementarity (see also [61]). With regard to the impact of 
particular resources and capabilities (P1a-d), a quantitative assessment was used to back up 
the qualitative results. 
“Doing qualitative analysis of all data with the aid of numbers is a good way of testing for 
possible bias, and seeing how robust our insights are” [56, p. 254]. 
Regarding our proposed interaction effect (P2), quantitative assessment was used for 
pattern discovery, which was then followed by an illustration of the interaction through 
enriched case descriptions.  
“In qualitative research numbers tend to get ignored. […] However, a lot of counting goes on in 
the background when judgments of qualities are being made. When we identify a theme or 
pattern, we are isolating something that (a) happens a number of times and (b) consistently 
happens in a specific way” [56, p. 253].  
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B. Data Collection 
Since this study aimed at answering the research question of why spokes participate in 
partnerships with a hub, the unit of analysis was the particular relationship between a hub and 
a spoke organization. In order to apply replication logic in analyzing the data, several of these 
dyadic relationships were examined in depth, each representing a single case. The cases were 
drawn from two different hub-and-spoke networks in order to further increase the 
generalizability of the findings [57]. By examining multiple spoke organizations in two 
different networks, it was ensured that enough variation existed in the variables of interest, 
particularly in the level of product complementarity between the solutions of hub and spoke 
[57]. 
The two hub organizations under consideration have historically focused on different core 
businesses. Hub A has its traditional core competency in delivering business application 
solutions. Hence, hub A mainly resides on the application layer (see Figure 2). Moreover, hub 
A has established its own SOA standard, providing an integration platform for various other 
application software components. Thus, hub A also covers the middleware layer. Hub B used 
to offer products and solutions in each of the five layers of the software stack. However, after 
a strategic shift in the 1990s, hub B decided to focus on infrastructure and middleware 
solutions. Accordingly, it is positioned on the middleware layer. 
The two hub companies are both large, globally acting EAS vendors that have fostered 
partnerships with a multitude of smaller ISVs that build their solutions on top of the hubs’ 
platforms. The solutions provided by these spokes can be found both on the business 
application as well as the middleware layers. For the purpose of this research, 17 spokes were 
selected that participate in one of the two networks: eight of them with hub A and nine with 
hub B.  
The spoke organizations were selected purposefully [62]. First, it was ensured that each 
spoke represented an independent legal entity; that is, none of them was a subsidiary of a 
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larger organization. Second, each spoke was a solution provider, building its system on top of 
the hub’s platform and, thereby, extending the overall system in a certain way. By increasing 
the number of cases rather than the number of interviewees per case we were able to account 
for the huge diversity among spoke companies. Data was collected through expert interviews 
within each spoke organization as well as by gathering secondary material on each case. 
Because the selected spoke organizations were fairly small (on average, the case companies 
employ around 20 individuals), one key individual per case was generally deemed sufficient to 
provide information about the partnership motives. Since the research question of this study 
concerns issues of strategic relevance, executives of the partner firms were selected as 
interview partners whenever possible. In six of the 17 cases, the CEO (or equivalent) agreed to 
participate in the study. Four spokes had a dedicated role of establishing and managing the 
partnership with the hub company. Consequently, these partnership managers were chosen as 
experts. In all other cases, individuals that were considered to have the best understanding of 
the respective companies’ motives for partnering were selected (e.g., the head of software or 
product development). In two of the larger case companies (MEDIA and PIM) more than one 
interview was necessary for gaining a comprehensive picture. In two other spoke 
organizations (MACHINE and ARCHIVE) the interviews were completed in follow-up 
meetings. Overall, the data set consists of 22 expert interviews within the 17 spoke 
organizations. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the analyzed spokes’ core businesses and 
the conducted interviews.  
All interviews were held face to face and took place on-site, except for one (PRINT) which 
was carried out via telephone, meeting the interviewee’s preferences. The interviews were 
conducted by the first author and a research scholar in German language and had an average 
duration of one hour. The conversations were semi-structured and based on an interview 
guideline that reflected the theoretical propositions developed above and also included general 
questions about the interviewee and the respective company (see Appendix 2). Although being 
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guided by the theoretical framework, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for 
new insights and model refinement in an exploratory manner. All interviews were tape-
recorded and transcribed, except for one case (MOBILE), where the expert felt uncomfortable 
with recording of the interview. Instead, comprehensive notes were taken in this case. In sum, 
the interview protocols resulted in more than 80,000 words of qualitative data. To ensure 
triangulation of the data and, thus, increase the internal validity of the study, publicly available 
documents like the companies’ Internet pages were analyzed [57]. 
C. Data Analysis 
In line with the goal of this study, a literal replication strategy was chosen to substantiate 
and refine the preliminary framework [57]. That is, we focused on spokes that had actually 
entered a partnership with a hub and studied whether there is a congruent pattern in the 
motives of spokes to partner. These motives are reflected by the attractiveness of different hub 
resources and capabilities (P1a-d) together with the level of product complementarity between 
hub and spoke (P2). 
Accordingly, the first step of data analysis was to assess the relevancy of each of our four 
types of hub resources and capabilities as partnership motives for each spoke organization. For 
this purpose, the interview transcripts were coded according to our theoretical framework [56]. 
Brief labels (Technology, Innovation, Market, and Reputation) were assigned to the respective 
text passages using the qualitative data analysis tool NVivo. Table 1 offers definitions of each 
construct along with exemplary indicators, as drawn from the data. The coding was initially 
done by the first author, resulting in a table of 171 assigned statements [61]. Following the 
coding by the first author, the second author likewise assigned the 171 statements to the 
respective categories. The comparison of the coding resulted in a relatively high inter-coder 
reliability of 94 percent according to Holsti [63]. The two coders subsequently re-examined 
the mismatched coding and reached consensus with the help of the third author acting as a 
neutral investigator.  
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Construct Definition Exemplary indicators 
Technology The hub’s synchronic capability to provide a 
comprehensive EAS that offers the potential 
to technically integrate complementary 
third-party solutions (based on [47]). 
Spokes access knowledge 
related to the platform 
Innovation The hub’s diachronic capability to 
constantly renew the platform (based on 
[14]). 
Spokes’ modular 
innovations make use of 
platform innovations 
Market The hub’s capability to provide partner firms 
with access to potential customers (based on 
[37]). 
Spokes use hub’s marketing 
channels 
Reputation The extent to which the hub’s brand name is 
associated with high quality by customers 
(based on [37]). 
Spokes use hub’s brand 
name to signal reliability 
Table 1: Definition of constructs and exemplary indicators 
Based on this assessment, stories were written on each case separately. The case stories 
helped us understand the relative importance of each dimension within the context of each 
case [56, 62]. Through this qualitative data analysis, we were able to not only scrutinize the 
propositions deduced from the literature but also gain an in-depth understanding of the nature 
of technological, commercial, and social capital in the context of each case. Interestingly, we 
found some strong variations regarding the impact of particular resources and capabilities of 
the hub. In fact, contrary to our propositions (1a-d) some of the hub resources and capabilities 
were seen as negative in some cases. 
In order to substantiate our initial qualitative assessment and clearly identify the impact 
variations between cases, we went into a more detailed coding of the particular quotes. For 
this purpose, the first and second author estimated the importance and the directional impact 
of the 171 categorized interview statements [56]. We used a scale from -2 (highly negative 
influence) over 0 (neutral) to 2 (highly positive influence) for our coding. The inter-coder 
reliability of this estimation was 69% [63]. Again, mismatched estimations were re-examined 
by the two coders with the third author acting as a referee in order to reach consensus. 
Congruence between this evaluation and the initial qualitative findings for each case increased 
our confidence in the validity of the study’s findings. 
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 Finally, the data was re-examined in order to explore the role of product-level 
complementarity regarding the spokes’ motivation to partner. For this purpose, the level of 
product-level complementarity between hub and spoke was first determined in each case [56]. 
This assessment was based on the product description by the interview partners as well as on 
an analysis of the hubs’ and the spokes’ company websites. For example, if the products of 
hub and spoke could be assigned to distinct layers in the software stack model (see Figure 2), 
then the level of layer overlap was rated low, indicating a high level of product 
complementarity [56]. The assessment of the layer overlap of the analyzed partnerships 
together with the evaluation of partnership motives were then used to discover patterns 
regarding the interplay of the input- and output-oriented factors (see P2). This examination 
was again followed by a qualitative in-depth analysis of the inter-relation between variations 
in layer overlap and the extent to which particular resources and capabilities of the hub 
motivated the spokes to partner [57, 64].  
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Analysis of Input-oriented Dimension 
Hub’s Capability to Provide Integrated Systems (Proposition 1a). As a common theme 
throughout all analyzed case companies, the hub’s synchronic capability to provide integrated 
systems was found to be one of the primary reasons for small EAS companies to partner with 
the hub. All analyzed spoke organizations saw limitations in their own solutions for covering 
customer demand. Hence, partnering with a hub was seen as a means to ensure the availability 
of a comprehensive enterprise system, which is necessary to sell niche solutions. Accessing 
technology-related know-how that resides within the hub organization was also found to be 
one of the primary partnership motives. To ensure knowledge absorption from the hub, some 
spokes emphasized the importance of personal informal ties with the hub. These relational ties 
helped the spokes build up the absorptive capacity necessary for getting access to the expertise 
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of the hub personnel [65]. These findings are illustrated in more detail by the cases of 
WORKFLOW and MACHINE. 
WORKFLOW provides solutions for e-business and groupware as well as portal solutions 
based on the middleware platform offered by hub B. Shortly after it had been founded, 
WORKFLOW decided to enter a partnership with hub B because of its “broad and 
comprehensive product portfolio” (sales director of WORKFLOW). The company 
collaborates with employees of hub B in specific projects in order to benefit from their know-
how. The sales director said that WORKFLOW had accumulated a large body of knowledge 
that is specific to hub B’s solutions over the years. B’s personnel have a very comprehensive 
understanding of B’s platform and know where knowledge resides inside hub B. This platform 
knowledge is important to absorb for WORKFLOW in order to ensure platform compatibility 
of its own solution.  
MACHINE became a partner of hub A soon after being founded in 2005. The company 
complements the EAS provided by hub A by offering software tools that connect A’s system 
to various kinds of machinery, for example vending machines or wind turbines; thus ensuring 
that data from the machines are automatically transferred to the ERP systems of customers 
(e.g., machinery owners). Since a large number of customers use hub A’s ERP system, the 
primary reason for entering the partnership was to get immediate access to technical 
knowledge about hub A’s system to ensure that the system interfaces built by MACHINE 
work properly. As one of the direct benefits from the partnership, MACHINE became one of 
the first companies to offer a complementary product based on the hub’s recently developed 
SOA. This resulted in a head start for MACHINE compared to competitors. Interestingly, the 
CEO stated that the knowledge transfer between hub A and MACHINE is not a standardized 
procedure, but instead results from the personal contacts between MACHINE’s and hub A’s 
personnel – in particular to hub A’s research area: “we have very good personal contacts to the 
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research division. If we have a technological problem, we ask [hub A]’s people if they can 
help us. It’s as if you ask a colleague within MACHINE” (CEO of MACHINE). 
Hub’s Capability to Innovate System Architectures (Proposition 1b). While the 
theoretical discussion suggests that spokes partner with a hub in order to benefit from its 
innovativeness, the empirical analysis showed that great variations exist regarding the spokes’ 
appreciation of the hub’s capability to innovate systems. Some companies were partnering 
with the hub because of its capability to provide system innovations. For example, the sales 
director of WORKFLOW stressed that his company depends on platform innovations for 
being able to constantly develop innovative complementary solutions, that is, new product 
features that complement the hub’s system. In a nutshell, WORKFLOW’s sales director said 
that “hub B is innovative and this is something that we need.”  
However, in other cases system innovations by the hub were not generally seen as 
beneficial. In fact, contrary to our proposition (P1b) the hub’s innovativeness was even seen as 
a threat for some spokes because it potentially renders the spokes’ business model obsolete. 
One of these companies is ARCHIVE, a partner of hub A, which has been offering 
complementary archiving functionality based on hub A’s enterprise application software for 
almost 20 years. ARCHIVE entered the partnership and started to develop complementary 
solutions when the first version of hub A’s EAS was on the market. The archiving 
functionality of this early version was very restricted (only four gigabytes of data could be 
filed), allowing ARCHIVE to successfully market its additional piece of software. Through 
the years, hub A released several new versions of its EAS with improved archiving 
functionality that partly rendered ARCHIVE’s solution obsolete. Each of these innovations by 
hub A in turn triggered a process of coming up with own innovations within ARCHIVE. For 
instance, when hub A enlarged the amount of data that could be filed, ARCHIVE focused on 
offering solutions to improve archiving performance. Although performance is still a key 
selling point, recent releases of hub A’s platform decreased the customers’ need for additional 
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performance-improving solutions, encouraging ARCHIVE to find a new niche. ARCHIVE 
then came up with tools that help customers comply with statutory requirements related to 
archiving that are specific to certain industries or regions. The historical development explains 
why ARCHIVE perceived hub A’s innovativeness as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
ARCHIVE’s partnership manager stated that “hub A’s innovativeness opens opportunities for 
ARCHIVE to develop new software based on these improvements.” On the other hand, the 
interviewee admitted, “ARCHIVE has to be careful. If [hub A] develops new solutions in the 
field of archiving, this could overlap with our solutions and render them obsolete.” Notably, 
the partnership manager explained that owing to the long-lasting collaboration between hub 
A’s and ARCHIVE’s employees and the personal relationships, it is often hub A’s staff that 
“warn” ARCHIVE in advance if new developments overlap with ARCHIVE’s functionality 
and even give hints about potential new niches for ARCHIVE. Thus, by being forewarned that 
own solutions may become obsolete, spokes may have more time to bring in their capability to 
innovate on a modular level and to come up with new solutions and functionalities that 
address new niches.  
While ARCHIVE’s take on hub A’s innovativeness is ambivalent, it is clearly perceived to 
be a threat by MEDIA, another spoke organization within A’s partnership network. MEDIA 
decided to provide complementary functionality specific to the media and newspaper industry, 
even though hub A offers a version of its EAS that is tailored to the needs of the media 
industry. Although MEDIA has been successfully developing niche functionality for the 
media industry for more than 20 years, the hub’s innovativeness poses a constant threat for the 
spoke organization because new releases of hub A’s industry solution may overlap with the 
functionality provided by MEDIA. Specifically, MEDIA struggles when decisions on 
investment for developing new functionality have to be made. MEDIA’s head of product 
development framed it in the following way: “There is always a high risk to invest in the 
development of new functionality because [hub A] may decide to include it into its solution.” 
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Although personal and informal contacts between MEDIA’s employees and hub personnel 
have emerged throughout the years, these links are of no great help for the spoke when it 
comes to anticipating future releases of hub A’s software, as MEDIA’s head of marketing 
explained. 
Hub’s Capability to Provide Access to Broad Markets (Proposition 1c). The empirical 
analysis showed that the hub’s capability to access broad and international markets generally 
played an important role in why small EAS vendors participate in hub-and-spoke partnership 
networks. Yet, there were some variations across the analyzed cases regarding the extent to 
which the hub’s commercial capital motivated the spokes to partner. 
The crucial role of the hub’s commercial capital as a partnership motive is well illustrated 
by the case of GROUP. This company was founded in 1980 as an engineering office, but has 
been developing software based on hub A’s platform since 2003. GROUP offers a tool that 
connects hub A’s enterprise system to a third-party vendor’s groupware solution. GROUP’s 
head of product development reported that after having started its software business, the 
company struggled to market its product. Specifically, because GROUP is a local and rather 
small company, its plan to sell the tool on a global scale initially failed. According to the head 
of product development, “one important aspect [of the partnership] is that together with [hub 
A] we try to find new customers on a global scale, such as in the U.S. and in Southeast Asia.” 
PIM, another partner of hub A, develops a product information management solution that 
allows customers to manage a large amount of product data and publish it in various ways 
such as websites, product brochures, or catalogs. Although PIM’s system could be used by 
customers in combination with any EAS solution, PIM decided to enter an exclusive 
partnership with hub A. The CEO of PIM described the motive for that step as follows: 
“Ideally, through a partnership with an established player, a company obtains a very good 
market access through using the channel of the large organization. That’s a very important 
aspect.” According to the CEO, a crucial part of these marketing benefits are personal 
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recommendations by hub employees: “In the best case, [the hub]’s sales staff tells the 
customer: ‘If you need a product management system, you should choose the one from [PIM]. 
That’s a great solution, and it is certified’.” In addition, the sales director of PIM explained 
that product information management is a relatively new topic and not yet established in the 
market. Therefore, PIM had trouble in convincing customers about the advantages of a 
product information management system. The sales director said that the “strategic goal of the 
partnership is to sensitize the market for the product information management topic with the 
help of [hub A].”  
Interestingly, some spoke organizations had high expectations regarding the access to the 
hub’s marketing capabilities that were not fulfilled. For example, the partnership manager of 
CRM, a small software firm that develops customer relationship management software based 
on hub B’s groupware system, was rather disappointed after having entered the partnership 
with B. ”Our expectations concerning marketing advantages might have been too high,” the 
interviewee concluded. 
Hub’s Reputation (Proposition 1d). The theoretical discussion suggested that tapping into 
an incumbent firm’s reputation may be a primary motive for small software firms to 
participate in hub-and-spoke partnership networks. The two examples of EMAIL and 
MACHINE illustrate what was found to be true for all analyzed companies: signaling 
trustworthiness and reliability through a partnership with a hub is a key motive for spoke 
organizations to participate in hub-and-spoke networks. 
EMAIL provides document and email archiving, IT security, and groupware solutions 
based on hub B’s platform. The company was founded in 2002 and entered a formal 
partnership with hub B three years later. Asked about the reasons for partnering with hub B, 
EMAIL’s head of software development stated that customers know that hub B and its 
products have been around for many years and will be around in the future. Since EMAIL’s 
products complement hub B’s solutions, customers trust that buying EMAIL’s software will 
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not be a false investment. “We benefit from [hub B]’s reputation because our company is not 
very well known yet,” said the head of software development. “With [hub B]’s logo we signal 
trustworthiness to our customers. Partnering with a large and well-known company is 
beneficial for us because of the high degree of familiarity.” A look at EMAIL’s website 
corroborated the importance of hub B’s brand name for the spoke as described by the head of 
software development, because the partnership is mentioned prominently on the cover page as 
well as in various other contexts.  
The CEO of MACHINE mentioned similar reputation effects of the partnership. As 
described above, on account of its specific product portfolio, MACHINE’s customers are 
almost exclusively large, global organizations. When approaching potential customers, the 
CEO of MACHINE experienced several times that “large corporations would not talk to a 
small software vendor like [MACHINE]. In these situations, the partnership with [hub A] and 
its reputation and brand name were a door opener for us.” 
Overall Assessment. The data analysis revealed partial support for the propositions 1a-d. 
While the hub’s capability to provide integrated systems and its reputation (P1a and d) were 
found to be important motives for all analyzed spoke organizations, the picture was different 
for its innovativeness and its commercial capital (P1b and c). In particular, there were strong 
differences between the spoke organizations regarding the benefits of the hub’s capability to 
innovate systems. While some spokes were found to benefit from the hub’s innovativeness, 
others feared the threat of their own solutions becoming obsolete. The case analysis also 
revealed variations in the extent to which the hub’s commercial capital motivated spokes to 
participate in a partnership with a platform vendor. Although all spokes rated the hub’s 
capability to access broad markets as beneficial, the degree to which commercial capital 
actually motivated complementors to participate in partnerships with the hub differed across 
the cases. 
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The evaluation of the extracted interview fragments supports these findings. Table 2 shows 
the number of quotes per case and the average number of quotes across all cases for each of 
the four partnership motives. Moreover, Table 2 gives the average strength and direction of 
the influence of the partnership motives for each case as well as across all cases (on a scale 
from -2 to +2) [61]. 
Case company Technology Innovation Market Reputation 
MACHINE 4 / 1.5 1 / 1 2 / 1 1 / 1 
CAD 3 / 1.67 5 / -1.4 5 / 1.4 n/a 
GROUP 2 / .5 1 / -2 6 / 1.17 2 / 2 
MOBILE 3 / 2 2 / -2 1 / 1 1 / 2 
MEDIA 6 / 1.5 2 / -2 5 / 1.4  1 / 1 
ARCHIVE 2 / 1.5 6 / 0 3 / 1.67 n/a 
PRINT n/a 2 / 0 1 / 2 4 / 1.5 
PIM 2 / 1 1 / 1 5 / 1.8 4 / 1.5 
PROCURE 7 / 1.29 4 / .5 2 / 2 2 / 1.5 
FINANCE 3 / .67 3 / 0 9 / 0 1 / 0 
EMAIL 1 / 1 1 / 0 3 / 1 5 / 1.8 
CRM 1 / 0 n/a 2 / 0 3 / 1.67 
ERP 4 / .75 n/a 1 / 0 3 / 1 
DECISION 1 / 0 n/a n/a 1 / 1 
PORTAL 7 / 1.43 n/a 3 / 1 1 / 2 
CONTENT 3 / 1.67 n/a n/a 2 / 1 
WORKFLOW 8 / 1.25 2 / 1.5 3 / 1 2 / 1.5 
Aggregation across all 
cases 
3.35 / 1.26 1.77 / -0.33 3 / 1.04 1.94 / 1.45 
Table 2: Evaluation of interview fragments (number of quotes per interview/average strength 
and direction, from -2 to 2) 
Overall, the hub’s capability to provide integrated systems (Technology) was the most 
frequently mentioned motive for participating in the partnership network (on average 3.35 
times per case). Also, the influence of this capability as indicated by the interview fragments 
was considerably high (on average 1.26). Although explicitly mentioned less than 2 times per 
interview (on average 1.94), the hub’s reputation (Reputation) was suggested to be an 
important motive (on average 1.45). The hub’s capability to access broad markets (Market) 
was ranked second with respect to the average number of explicit quotes (3) and third 
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regarding the average importance indicated by the respective fragments (1.04). The picture 
was different for the hub’s capability to innovate systems (Innovation). While the hub’s 
innovativeness was an important issue (on average 1.8 mentions per interview), its influence 
on the spoke organization’s motivation to partner varied considerably and was close to zero on 
average (-0.3). In order to explain this interesting observation, the next section sheds more 
light on differences and commonalities between the analyzed spoke organizations regarding 
product-level complementarity. 
B. Analysis of Output-oriented Dimension 
The Role of Product-Level Complementarity (Proposition 2). When examining the 
profiles of the analyzed spoke companies as shown in Appendix 1 more closely, it becomes 
apparent that they vary substantially. While some spoke organizations provide middleware 
solutions, others focus on business applications. Accordingly, the level of product 
complementary, as indicated by the distance between hub and spoke in the layered EAS stack 
model (Figure 2), varies substantially across cases. The solutions of some spokes overlap to a 
greater extent with the core business of their partner than do others. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the analyzed companies’ layer overlap with the respective hub organization. For 
example, MEDIA offers business applications for the media industry that are closely 
integrated with the business applications of hub A. Thus, layer overlap in the EAS stack 
between MEDIA and hub A can be assumed to be high. As another example, ARCHIVE 
provides archiving solutions that complement hub A’s EAS. Specifically, it connects hub A’s 
platform to database systems and therefore acts on the middleware layer. Given that hub A 
mainly focuses on the application layer, but also offers middleware solutions, a medium layer 
overlap between hub A and ARCHIVE can be assumed. WORKFLOW provides applications 
based on hub B’s middleware platform. Since hub B focuses on middleware solutions, layer 
overlap between WORKFLOW and hub B is rather low. 
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In line with proposition 2, the question is raised whether there is a systematic link between 
the observed variations in layer overlap and the variations in the way in which certain 
resources and capabilities, such as innovativeness (Innovation) and commercial capital 
(Market), determine partnership motivation. In order to explore a possible interaction effect, 
Table 4 was created which relates the average frequency as well as the average importance of 
each of the four resources and capabilities to the degree of layer overlap between hub and 
spoke (low, medium, and high).  
Layer overlap  Low  Medium  High  
Case companies  
PROCURE 
FINANCE 
CRM 
ERP 
DECISION 
CONTENT 
WORKFLOW  
MACHINE 
CAD 
GROUP 
ARCHIVE 
PRINT 
EMAIL 
PORTAL 
MOBILE 
MEDIA 
PIM 
Table 3: Layer overlap of hub’s and spoke’s solution in the enterprise software stack 
 Average number of quotes per 
interview 
Indicated influence of respective 
factors (-2 to 2) 
Degree of layer 
overlap 
Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Technology 3.86 2.71 3.67 1.07 1.37 1.55 
Innovation 1.29 2.29 1.67 .56 -0.5 -1.4 
Market 2.43 3.29 3.67 0.41 1.26 1.55 
Reputation 2 1.86 2 1.21 1.69 1.5 
Table 4: Evaluation of interview fragments, clustered according to the degree of layer 
overlap 
The figures indeed suggest a relationship between layer overlap and inconsistencies in 
findings about the appreciation of innovativeness and commercial capital. Examining the lines 
of Technology, Innovation, Market and Reputation reveals that the average ratings were 
relatively constant across the degree of layer overlap for Technology and Reputation. Thus, 
these two resources and capabilities were relatively important motivations for partnering 
irrespective of the level of product complementarity. In contrast, the influence of 
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innovativeness moves toward negative values with an increasing degree of layer overlap 
between hub and spoke, that is, from .56 for low levels of layer overlap to -0.5 and -1.4 for 
medium and high layer overlap. 
Similarly, moving along the Market line indicates that the influence of the hub’s 
commercial capital increased with higher levels of layer overlap, that is, lower levels of 
product complementarity. Both the average number of quotes per interview (2.43, 3.29, 3.67) 
as well as the indicated influence of the hub’s marketing capabilities (.41, 1.26, 1.55) increase 
considerably with higher levels of layer overlap. The following section explores the 
relationship between product-level complementarity and the hub’s innovativeness as well as 
its commercial capital by re-examining the qualitative data. 
Interaction Effect between Product Complementarity and the Hub’s Innovativeness 
(Proposition 2a). The empirical analysis of Proposition 1b showed that although the analyzed 
spokes acknowledged the hub’s innovative capability, it did not generally strengthen the 
partnership motivation of all spokes. In fact, some spokes were rather threatened by these 
diachronic capabilities. A re-examination of the cases in light of the discovered differences in 
layer overlap suggests that this is particularly true for those spokes with a relatively low level 
of product complementarity, that is, if layer overlap between the hub and spoke solutions in 
the software stack is high. In this case, the solutions of hub and spoke cover related 
functionality. Therefore, the hub’s innovativeness may eventually render the spoke’s solution 
obsolete. Thus, the empirical findings suggest that the hub’s innovative capability is not a key 
driver of partnership formation per se, but rather in combination with the level of product-
level complementarity between hub and spoke. This observation is exemplified by the cases 
PIM, MEDIA, and WORKFLOW. PIM has a high layer overlap with hub A (see Table 3), 
since its product information management solution clearly overlaps with hub A’s core 
business on the application layer. PIM used to develop application functionality in a niche 
market that was different from that of hub A. Thus, the application software of PIM went 
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beyond hub A’s enterprise software system. However, a company that was recently acquired 
by hub A came up with a very similar solution, raising questions about the sustainability of the 
partnership and causing a serious threat to PIM’s business model. The CEO of PIM 
commented “without doubt, this makes it very difficult for us to build up a real strategic 
partnership.”  
Similarly, the hub’s system-level innovativeness was seen as problematic in the case of 
MEDIA, which not only acts on the same layer as hub A but even competes with hub A in 
several fields (high layer overlap). As a consequence, there is a constant threat of 
obsolescence, because future releases of hub A’s enterprise system may wipe out the 
competitive advantage that MEDIA currently maintains in certain fields.  
In contrast, if layer overlap is low, the positive impact of the hub’s innovativeness is 
strengthened. For example, WORKFLOW and hub B have a very low layer overlap because 
hub B offers middleware solutions and WORKFLOW focuses on providing application 
functionality. Therefore, architectural innovations by the hub were perceived as rather 
beneficial by WORKFLOW. Even though these innovations may result in additional effort for 
WORKFLOW because its e-business, groupware, and portal solutions may have to be 
adjusted to the idiosyncrasies of new releases of hub B’s platform, such platform innovations 
give WORKFLOW the chance to innovate on a modular level and come up with new products 
that attract customers. Taken together, this leads us to the following revised proposition: 
Proposition 2a: The lower the level of product complementarity (i.e., the higher the layer 
overlap in the EAS stack) between the solutions offered by hub and spoke, the weaker is the 
proposed positive effect of the hub’s capability to innovate system architectures on the spoke’s 
motivation to participate in a partnership with the hub. 
Interaction Effect between Product Complementarity and the Hub’s Commercial 
Capital (Proposition 2b). The empirical data also revealed that the level of product-level 
complementarity changed the intensity with which the hub’s commercial capital was seen as 
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beneficial by the analyzed spokes. For some spokes, access to broad markets was the main 
reason for partnering, while for others it played a secondary role. The reason for this may be 
seen in the fact that if a spoke operates on the same layer as the respective hub, then the spoke 
is able to particularly make use of the hub’s marketing channels. This is because both partners 
address very similar markets and target groups, such as similar procurement managers and 
users within potential customer organizations. In contrast, if the hub and spoke operate on 
different layers, it is more difficult to merge marketing campaigns. Thus, the impact of the 
hub’s commercial capital on partnering motivation is not as high as in the case of high layer 
overlap. 
CRM shows a low level of layer overlap with hub B’s middleware platform. Accordingly, 
the benefits obtained from hub B’s marketing activities were low, since they were directed to 
the middleware rather than to specific software applications such as the one offered by CRM. 
The picture was different for those spokes that show a higher degree of layer overlap with the 
respective hub, such as GROUP with hub A. The groupware solution of GROUP is closely 
integrated with the EAS system of hub A. In fact, as groupware functionality becomes more 
important for customers, hub A actively informs customers that this functionality is available 
through its partner GROUP. GROUP was even able to increase its sales to an international 
level via its partnership with hub A. According to the interviewee, this would not have been 
possible otherwise. Similarly, PIM was able to gain broad market access by tapping into the 
hub’s distribution and sales network. Accordingly, the following revised proposition is put 
forth: 
Proposition 2b: The lower the level of product complementarity (i.e., the higher the layer 
overlap in the EAS stack) between the solutions offered by hub and spoke, the stronger is the 
proposed positive effect of the hub’s commercial capital on the spoke’s motivation to 
participate in a partnership with the hub. 
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Summary of Findings. Taken together, the results revealed that the impact of both the 
hub’s innovativeness and its commercial capital are moderated by layer overlap. If layer 
overlap exists, then the impact of the hub’s innovativeness moves from a positive to a negative 
effect (negative moderation effect), while the impact of the hub’s commercial capital becomes 
stronger (positive moderation effect). The refined theoretical framework including the newly 
formulated propositions 2a and 2b is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Layer overlap in the 
EAS stack
Technological capital
Hub’s capability to provide 
integrated systems
Spoke’s motivation to 
partner with the hub
Social capital
Hub’s capability to 
innovate system 
architectures
Commercial capital
Hub’s capability to provide 
access to broad markets
Hub’s repuation
P1a (+)
P1c (+)
P1d (+)
P2a (-)
P2b (+)
P1b (+)
 
Figure 3: Refined explanatory model of spokes’ motivation to participate in hub-and-spoke 
networks in the EAS industry 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
By studying the motivation of EAS companies to participate in partnerships with larger 
platform vendors, this study complements the existing body of knowledge on the emergence 
of hub-and-spoke networks [13, 23, 24]. While previous literature has largely focused on hub 
organizations, this study takes the perspective of spokes. Therefore, this study builds on 
previous work that examined specific partnership motives of firms in the EAS industry from 
an input-oriented perspective [18, 40, 41]. While previous research has focused on particular 
resources and capabilities as motives for partnering, this study considers multiple dimensions 
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simultaneously. Based on the broader literature on inter-firm partnerships, four types of 
resources and capabilities of the hub are identified that motivate spokes to partner with the 
hub: (1) the hub’s ability to provide integrated systems, (2) the hub’s ability to innovate 
systems, (3) the hub’s commercial capital, and (4) the hub’s reputation.  
In addition, this research builds on more recent work that has taken an output-oriented 
perspective in explaining the success of inter-firm alliances and partnerships [4, 43-45]. Based 
on this perspective, it has been proposed that the level of product complementarity between 
hub and spoke contributes to explaining why spokes are motivated to partner with the hub 
[42]. The empirical findings revealed a new and interesting interaction effect between the 
input- and output-oriented perspectives. The results indicate that out of the four hub resources 
and capabilities, only two are generally important motives for spokes to partner with the hub. 
These are the hub’s capability to provide an integrated system and the hub’s reputation in the 
market. The impacts of the two other factors, that is, the hub’s innovativeness and the hub’s 
commercial capital, are contingent upon the level of complementarity that exists between the 
products offered by the partners.  
By identifying an interaction effect between layer overlap in the software stack and the 
platform vendor’s innovativeness and commercial capital, our results contribute to explaining 
the so far inconclusive findings on the role of product-level complementarity in partnership 
arrangements [18, 41, 43, 44]. In particular, our findings suggest that instead of having a direct 
positive or negative effect on the complementor’s motivation to partner with the hub, product-
level complementarity should be considered as a moderating factor regarding the benefits 
obtained from different types of external resources and capabilities. In other words, our results 
contribute to existing literature in that by combining the resource-based perspective on inter-
firm arrangements and the notion of product-level complementarity, the explanatory power is 
higher than if both perspectives are applied in isolation. 
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This insight has wider implications for the determinants of partnership success [44, 54]. If 
product complementarity is low, that is, if layer overlap between the hub and spoke solution is 
high, two opposing implications on partnership success may result. On the one hand, the 
benefits from the hub’s commercial capital may be particularly high for the spoke. On the 
other hand, the threat of system-level innovations by the hub may be particularly high. Thus, 
in analyzing the success of hub-and-spoke networks, it appears useful to consider possible 
trade-offs between particular hub resources and capabilities resulting from different levels of 
product complementarity. 
The theoretical insights of this study lead to a number of managerial implications. Spoke 
organizations may benefit from the finding that not all of the hub’s resources and capabilities 
are generally advantageous for them. In particular, if hub and spoke operate at the same layer 
in the software stack, the spoke has to be aware of the risks arising from the hub’s innovative 
capability to introduce new system architectures or business applications that may render the 
spoke’s solutions obsolete. In this case, the spoke is well advised to keep itself constantly up 
to date regarding the hub’s planned innovations. Close inter-personal linkages to the hub’s 
personnel seem to be particularly important for this purpose. Another counterstrategy lies in 
the spoke’s own innovativeness. If the spoke is able to constantly innovate, the risk of 
becoming obsolete is generally smaller, especially if the spoke’s innovations are aligned with 
those of the hub. In contrast, if a spoke’s solution has the characteristics of a commodity with 
little innovative potential it may be more fruitful to complement the system of a hub that 
mainly acts on adjacent layers. As a consequence, benefits from the hub’s commercial capital 
are smaller. At the same time, however, the risk of obsolescence decreases.  
Large and well-established EAS vendors may also learn from the findings of this study. 
Platform vendors aim at fostering partnership networks with smaller niche players in order to 
benefit from network externalities and lower the costs and complexity of the overall systems. 
Knowing which capabilities the spokes aim at when participating in hub-and-spoke networks 
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may help hub organizations attract and select partners and manage the partnerships in a better 
way. Also, in order to foster sustainable inter-firm networks, hub organizations should reflect 
carefully whether it might be advantageous to explicitly focus on one layer of the EAS stack 
and leave adjacent layers to the partners. 
The findings of this study are specific to the EAS industry but can partially be transferred 
to other industries and provide guidance for organizations in hub-and-spoke networks outside 
the EAS sector. Spoke organizations in the EAS industry usually do not exchange goods with 
the respective hub but sell their solutions directly to the market, reinforcing the importance of 
the access to the larger partner’s commercial capital and its reputation. While the hub’s 
commercial and social capital may therefore be of minor relevance for spoke companies that 
engage in exchange relationships with platform vendors (as in the case of the automotive 
sector), complementors in these industries may still benefit from the findings of this study. In 
particular, the interaction effect between product-level complementarity and the hub’s 
innovative capability may be important for these spoke companies. In addition, in industries 
that develop products or services that are less complex than enterprise software, the access to 
system integration know-how of the hub may be of lower importance because a higher degree 
of modularity is more feasible. Moreover, tapping into the hub’s reputation may be less 
important because customers can assess the quality of less complex products in advance, 
reducing the necessity of signaling reliability through a partnership. On the other hand, a 
partner’s commercial capital and its innovative capabilities may still be of primary interest for 
spokes, reinforcing the importance of the discussed interaction effects. 
It should be kept in mind that the results of this research are based on a limited set of data. 
The data set consists of the partnership networks of two hubs. Although only a limited number 
of large hub organizations exist within the global EAS industry, peculiarities of other hub 
organizations may not be reflected by the data set. Moreover, even though rigor was ensured 
through having two authors code the data independently, the qualitative examination, the 
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assessment of the importance and direction of motivational factors, as well as the evaluation 
of layer overlap may still be biased due to subjective ratings. In addition, despite the fact that 
increasing the number of cases and relying on a lower number of knowledgeable experts per 
case is consistent with the study’s goals, this approach may entail the risk of a key informant 
bias [66].  
A viable next step would be to corroborate the findings of this study by testing the 
developed explanatory model through a large-scale quantitative study. Another fruitful avenue 
for future studies would be to move away from the rather generic stack model and analyze the 
product complementarity between the solutions offered by hubs and spokes in more detail, 
both in the EAS industry and in other industries. Specifically, it may be interesting to find out 
whether effects similar to the ones identified between layers (i.e., layer overlap) also exist 
within the layers of the stack. In other words, a fine-grained inspection of the differences and 
commonalities between groups of spoke organizations and their implications promises to be 
particularly insightful. 
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APPENDIX 1: CASE COMPANIES AND INTERVIEWS 
Case HUB Core Business Inter-
views 
Interview Partner(s) 
MACHINE A Integration between the hub’s system and various machines such as vending machines 2 Founder and CEO 
CAD A Integration between the hub’s system and a CAD system of a different vendor 1 Partnership manager 
GROUP A Integration between the hub’s system and a groupware system of a different vendor 1 Head of product development 
MOBILE A Systems for automatic, mobile data recording used for inventory management 1 Head of sales, marketing, and partnership management 
MEDIA A Full-range supplier of IT systems and services for newspaper publishing companies 3 
Head of product development 
Head of industry solution 
Head of marketing 
ARCHIVE A Integration between the hub’s system and various archiving systems 2 Partnership manager 
PRINT A Integration between the hub’s system and various enterprise output systems 1 Head of software development 
PIM A Product information management systems for cross-media publishing 2 Founder and CEO, Sales director 
PROCURE B Groupware and e-procurement solutions based on the hub’s platform 1 Head of IT 
FINANCE B Groupware and workflow applications for the financial services industry based on the hub’s platform. 1 Founder and CEO 
EMAIL B Document and email archiving, IT security, and groupware solutions based on the hub’s platform 1 
Head of software 
development 
CRM B CRM, project and knowledge management systems based on the hub’s platform  1 Partnership manager 
ERP B Enterprise resource planning software based on the hub’s platform 1 Director of software development 
DECISION B Decision support systems for credit approval processes in the financial services industry based on the hub’s platform 1 Founder and CEO 
PORTAL B Solutions for archiving, groupware, CRM, and portals through combining own 
components with the hub’s platform 1 Co-founder and director 
CONTENT B Applications for content management, enterprise portals, groupware, and ERP 
systems based on the hub’s platform 1 Owner and director 
WORKFLOW B E-business, groupware, and portal solutions based on the hub’s platform 1 Sales director 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE (TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN) 
A. Information regarding company and interview partner 
• Organization’s main business area, historical development 
• Interviewee’s position within organization, role regarding partnership 
B. Partnership formation 
• When was the partnership formed? What were the strategic goals associated with the 
decision to enter the partnership? 
• Which formal criteria had to be met and which steps had to be taken in order to 
become a partner? 
 C. Partnership dynamics 
• Which strategic challenges or risks emerge throughout the partnership? Which are the 
reasons for these challenges and risks? 
• Has the nature of the partnership changed over time? 
 D. Operational aspects of the partnership 
• What is the procedure of cooperating with the partner in a specific project? 
• How are operational challenges managed? 
 E. Partnership Success 
• What impact has the partnership on the success of your business?  
• From your point of view, why is the partnership successful or not successful 
respectively? 
• In your opinion, how should/will the partnership develop over time and which steps 
have to be taken?  
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